Climate Policy And Petroleum Depletion by Khanna, Neha & Chapman, Duane
WP 97 - 01 
January 1997 
Working Paper 
Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853-7801 USA 
Climate Policy And Petroleum Depletion 
Neha Khanna and Duane Chapman 
• 
CLIMATE POLICY AND PETROLEUM DEPLETION 
Neha Khanna and Duane Chapman 
Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics
 
Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. - 14853
 
January 1997
 
Neha Khanna is a Ph.D. candidate in Resource and Environmental Economics. She is 
currently on leave from the Tata Energy Research Institute, New Delhi, India. 
• 
Duane Chapman is Professor of Resource and Environmental Economics. 
Abstract 
This paper extends the Nordhaus DICE model to include the demands for coal, oil, 
and natural gas. These demands depend on own price, prices of substitute fuels, per capita 
income, and population. An augmented Hotelling model captures the effect of depleting oil 
resources. A methodological advantage of including price, income, and population sensitive 
energy demand functions is that it allows substitution possibilities in the 'production' of 
emissions. Furthermore, it allows the analysis of energy tax regimes in an environment of 
growing world population and income, non-decreasing energy and carbon intensity, and 
declining petroleum availability. 
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Our future lies not in the stars, but in our models. 
(William Nordhaus, 1994, p. 6) 
I. Introduction 
The Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model developed by William 
Nordhaus represents a new genre of economic analysis in the context of climate change. It 
has been widely published and discussed in the Economic Journal and elsewhere. (National 
Academy of Sciences 1983, Nordhaus 1991, 1992, 1994). In subsequent work, Nordhaus and 
Zili Yang (1996) expanded this approach to encompass several world regions which may 
work cooperatively, or each may work in pursuit of maximum benefit for itself. These 
models combine the standard tools of optimal economic growth with climate modeling. The 
interaction between these two facets is established via greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
ocean storage, and climate induced damage that links temperature rise to loss in world output. 
The concatenation between optimal economic growth and climate modeling forms the 
starting point of the current analysis. In this paper, we extend the DICE model by elaborating 
the relationship of economic growth to petroleum resource depletion and the emissions of 
GHGs. Carbon emissions depend directly on the levels of coal, natural gas, oil and synfuel 
consumption. There are finite oil resources that, along with the cost of the backstop, 
influence the optimal trajectory of oil production. The resulting oil price trajectory affects the 
demand for the other fuels, and thence, the level of global carbon emissions. As may be 
anticipated under these plausible conditions, projected climate change can be somewhat 
-

greater than otherwise expected. 
II. Greenhouse gas emissions and the existence of decarbonization 
In the DICE model, Nordhaus projects uncontrolled GHG emissions as proportional to 
world economic output.1 The evolution of technology brings two additional forces into play. 
First, total factor productivity, A(t), increases, so that the production isoquant shifts outward 
over time. This implies that the same physical quantities of capital, K(t}, and labour, L(t), 
produce an increasing output, Q(t), over time. See equations (1)-(4). 
Second, the emissions to output ratio, o(t), decreases monotonically. That is, the ray 
defining the relation between emissions and output rotates towards the output axis with time. 
Nordhaus assumes this decline in o(t) on the grounds that it is consistent with historical data 
and with the results of some energy models. At the same time, he notes that there is a great 
deal of uncertainty and speculation here, and acknowledges that there is no correct assumption 
regarding the future trend in the CO2-GNP ratio. According to his perspective, in the long 
tenn this ratio could fall by as much as 1.5% per year or by as little as 0.5% per year 
(Nordhaus 1994, pp. 66-70). 
Furthennore, for both parameters A(t) and o(t}, the rate of change declines by a 
numerically identical amount. These relationships are presented in equations (5)-(9). The 
variables git) and grit) denote the rate of change in total factor productivity and carbon 
intensity, respectively; E(t) represents uncontrolled emissions. All other variables are as 
defined in the text above. The initial, i.e., 1965, values for all variables are detennined from 
historically observed data. 
-

Only carbon dioxide (COz) and chloroflorocarbons (CFCs) emissions are proportional to output All 
other GHGs are determined outside the model and are independent of the level of gross world product. 
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E(t) = o(t) Q(t) 
A(t) :: A(1965) egA(t) 
A(l965) = 0.00963 
0(1965) = 0.519 
80 (1965) = -1.25 % per year 
8i1965) = 1.41 % per year 
6A = 1.1 % per year 
Combining, we get the following expression for emissions: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
-
The key factors determining the total level of uncontrolled emissions in DICE are, 
thus, the level of world output and autonomous technological change. The emissions 
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trajectory rises slowly during the entire horizon. The eventual stabilization of emissions is 
due, in part, to the stabilization in world population and in world economic product. This 
decline in emissions growth is reinforced by the decline in the growth rate of total factor 
productivity. 
While these factors are important, they are not the only detenninants of the emissions 
prome of an economy. Total emissions depend not only on the amount of output produced, 
but also on how it is produced. In other words, the fuel mix and factors affecting it: energy 
prices, per capita income, resource availability, and substitutability, for example, are equally 
significant factors. At the same time, the carbon intensity of the global economy depends on 
the relative future growth of presently developing and developed economies. The emissions 
to output ratio can decline only if, ceteris paribus, the observed decline in the carbon 
intensity of the developed countries more than outweighs the possible increase in the carbon 
intensity of developing countries, or if both decline. Exactly what will happen is not certain, 
a priori. This is apparent from table 1 which shows the global carbon intensity between 1929 
and 1989. While it is true that the carbon-GNP ratio has declined during this entire period, it 
is instructive to consider two smaller time periods separately. Between 1929 and 1960, the 
carbon intensity declined sharply. However, the period from 1960 experienced a slight 
increase, indicating the growing importance of developing countries in the global energy­
economy. 
-
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Table 1: Global Carbon Intensity, 1929-1989 
Year Tons of C 11000 1989 US $ 
1929 0.409 
1938 0.366 
1950 0.343 
1960 0.219 
1970 0.219 
1980 0.241 
1989 0.232 
Source: Nordhaus (1994, p. 67) 
Note: "Ton" refers to the metric ton and not the U.S. ton. 
This trend in carbon intensity is reinforced by an underlying trend in the patterns of 
energy consumption of high income and other countries. Figure 1 shows energy use per unit 
of economic output from 1971 to 1992 for 101 countries grouped as high income countries 
and the rest of the world (ROW) or other countries.2 While there is a slight upward trend in 
GDP data for this analysis were obtained from the Penn World Tables (version 5.6). Details of this data 
-

base are available in Summers and Heston (1991). Energy consumption data were obtained from World Bank 
(1995). Countries were categorized according to the World Bank's definition of countries by income class 
5 
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the energy intensity of the countries comprising ROW during this period, energy intensity for 
the entire sample declined by almost 18%, closely following the strong trend for high income 
countries. This is because high income countries dominated world energy consumption and 
output in the past: in 1971 they accounted for 8004 % of total commercial energy 
consumption, and 67.7 % of the world's economic product. However, this highly skewed 
pattern of consumption and output is being slowly eroded with the ROW's share rising 
steadily (see figure 2).3 If this trend continues, and we believe it will, then the future global 
trend in energy intensity is likely to be dominated by the consumption patterns of the ROW 
countries. This, in turn, is likely to offset the historic decline in global energy intensity.4 
This is contrary to the standard assumptions of many prominent macroeconomic energy and 
climate change models (see Peck and Teisberg 1992 and 1995, Nordhaus 1994, Nordhaus and 
Yang 1996, and Manne et at. 1995). 
Manne and Richels (1992, pp. 32-34) review the literature on this issue, and conclude 
that there is no econometric evidence of autonomous energy efficiency improvements (AEEl) 
in post 1947 USA. They claim that the reason for the common assumption of positive AEEI 
is possibly the optimistic outlook of energy technologists. In their own modeling, they 
followed the existing practice and hypothesize a positive global AEEL The AEEI-declining 
carbon intensity is a highly significant, unresolved issue in climate change policy analysis. 
(World Bank, 1994). Countries included in our sample are listed in appendix A. 
In both figures 1 and 2, "world" refers to the aggregate for the 101 countries in the sample. 
4 
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If the existing growth rates for each group of countries were to continue, the global energy intensity 
curve is necessarily convex, declining now but rising at some future date. Of course, the trade in goods with 
differing embodied energy is a factor to consider in this analysis. 
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We have developed a framework to address the issues raised here. Our framework is 
based on the Nordhaus (1994) model, a brief summary of which is provided in appendix B. 
m. Dynamic Integrated Climate Assessment for a Fossil Economy 
In the Khanna-Chapman analysis (KCA) there are four carbon based fuels - coal, oil, 
natural gas, and a coal-based synthetic fuel that acts as the backstop. We assume that the oil 
market is the driving force of the energy economy. Oil production is determined via an 
augmented Hotelling-type optimization framework for a market with shifting demand 
(Chapman 1993). Producers face a rising linear demand curve that shifts outward over time 
in response to a growing world population and rising per capita incomes. At the same time, 
extraction costs increase steadily, as specified exogenously. In addition, the backstop cost 
sets an upper bound on the price of oil. Producers maximize the net present value of profits 
taking account of these countervailing forces, and also finite remaining resources. The 
optimal production trajectory is such that remaining oil resources are exhausted when the 
rising oil price passes the cost of the backstop. (This trajectory is derived analytically in 
appendix C.) 
The per capita demands for coal and for natural gas are determined by per capita 
income, own prices, and prices of all other fuels through linear homogenous Cobb-Douglas 
functions. Oil is replaced by a liquid fuel backstop, a synthetic fuel in our case, whose 
demand is also determined via a similar function in prices and income. Energy prices are 
assumed to grow steadily. 
-
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Finally, carbon emissions are calculated from the aggregate consumption/production of 
fossil fuels through carbon emission coefficients that translate energy units to tons of carbon. 
While the extension of the DICE model represented by the KCA is simple, it 
incorporates some significant conceptual details. Here we allow for explicit substitution in 
the "production" of emissions. This substitutability is captured by the cross-price elasticities, 
and is reflected in the changing fuel shares in total emissions production. In addition, by 
allowing interfuel substitution, KCA endogenizes the change in energy and carbon intensity 
that occurs in response to changes in relative prices. Lastly, we do not impose exogenous 
improvements in future carbon and energy intensity. This is in concert with the discussion, 
and the data presented in table 1, and in figures I and 2. This has important implications 
since autonomous reductions in carbon and energy intensity could camouflage a significant 
part of the costs of reducing GHG emissions. The analysis by Chapman et aL. (1995, pp. 6-7) 
shows that a stable carbon intensity leads to much higher temperature increases relative to 
those obtained by Nordhaus. Consequently, with the other parameters remaining unchanged, 
the optimal control rate rises to approximately 35% per year by 2115 instead of the 14-15% 
per year in the Nordhaus optimal case. 
IV. Parameter values 
The only parameters values that differ between KCA and DICE are those for the 
energy sector. These are summarized in appendix D. All other parameters are assigned the 
same values to maintain consistency. A few comments: 
-
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Fossil fuel prices 
Since the early to mid 1980s, the real prices of coal and natural gas have been 
declining steadily. Prior to that period, they rose sharply as shown in table 2, overleaf. For 
our analysis, we assume that the real prices for coal and natural gas grow at 0.1 % per year 
starting from the 1995 values. This is roughly consistent with the data from the past three 
decades for USA. The same growth rate is assumed for the price of the synthetic fuel. 
-
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Table 2: Coal and natural gas prices (USA, 1989 dollars) 
Year Coal ($/ron)' Natural gas ($11000 COb 
1965 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
Growth rate (% pa):c 
1965-1980 
1980-1995 
1965-1995 
21.82 
38.88 
43.52 
39.69 
24.77 
22.56 
+ 4.71 
- 4.29 
+ 0.11 
2.27 
2.31 
4.33 
5.40 
3.72 
3.14 
+ 4.40 
- 2.12 
+ 1.09 
a: refers	 to the delivered price to utilities 
b: refers to the volume weighted price for all consuming sectors 
c: authors' calculations based on data presented 
Sources:	 For coal, data are from ElA (1994). For natural gas, price and consumption 
data are from AGA (1981) and ElA (1996). See appendix D also. 
-
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Price and income elasticities 
There is no consensus in the literature on the income, own-, and cross-price elasticities 
of demand for coal and natural gas.s Following Drennen (1993, pp. 78-79), we set the 
income elasticity at 1 and the own-price elasticity at 0.5. The cross-price elasticities are half 
the own-price elasticity. Since we assume that oil drives the energy economy, the prices of 
the other fuels do not affect the demand for oil. However, the price of oil has a positive 
influence on the demand for coal and natural gas. Also, note that as long as oil is being 
produced, the synfuel does not affect the demand for the other fuels. It is only when oil 
resources are exhausted that synfuel production begins. Then, its slowly rising price exerts an 
upward pressure on the demand for coal and natural gas through the cross-substitution effect.6 
Remaining crude oil resources 
Remaining resources refers to the total conventional crude oil available for recovery. 
It is the sum of undiscovered resources and identified reserves (Chapman 1993, p. 334). 
Using the ninety fifth percentile point on the frequency distribution for original resources 
developed by the U.S. Geological Survey, Chapman estimates that the 1990 remaining crude 
oil resources were 2100 billion barrels. A similar estimate has been used by Manne and 
Richels (1992: see pp. 38-39 for discussion). To this figure, we added the cumulative 
production from 1965 to 1990 to obtain an estimate of approximately 2500 billion barrels of 
See Drennen (1993) for a good survey of energy demand elasticities at the global and regional levels. 
An alternative specification would blend declining petroleum use with growing synfuel use. However, ­
this would not significantly affect the results considered here. 
11 
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remaining crude oil resources in 1965.7 According to Manne and Richels, the ninety fifth 
percentile constitutes a practical upper bound on undiscovered resources. By using this value 
we allow for the possibility that technology improvements and future price increases will lead 
to larger quantities of economically recoverable oil. 
Cost of oil extraction 
The model is calibrated such that starting from 1965, the average cost of extraction to 
producers rises to 10 $/bl in 1990 (Chapman 1993) and continues to grow at the same rate 
thereafter, i.e., 1.61 % per year.8 
V. DICE and KCA: a comparison of results 
The Khanna-Chapman model is operated under two scenarios: the base case with no 
CO2 control, and the case where the control rate for CO2 emissions is optimized (the "optimal 
case"). Following Nordhaus, we discuss results for the first 150 years of the horizon only. 
The source of any difference in the results of the two models is the energy submodel. Hence, 
we begin with a discussion of these results first. 
Data for crude production from 1965 to 1990 were obtained from Chapman (undated). 
-

Note that the difference between the market price of crude oil and the cost of extraction is the economic 
rent on crude oil production. 
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Per capita energy consumption 
Oil production increases monotonically till resources are exhausted.9 Unlike the 
original Hotelling model, in the presence of an upwardly shifting demand for oil, production 
here must be increased in order to equalize the discounted value of profits in every period. 
This trajectory also maximizes social welfare (Chapman 1993). Under the base case, oil 
resources are exhausted in 2025, with the peak production at 61.9 billion barrels per year. 
As oil is exhausted, production of the synfuel begins. Starting from an initial value 
that takes up the slack created by the exhaustion of oil resources, the per capita demand for 
the synfuel rises slowly. The per capita demands for coal and natural gas also rise from the 
initial (1965) values. For each of these fuels, the positive income and cross-substitution 
effects on demand more than outweigh the negative own price effect. In part, this is due to 
the elasticity values assumed, and in part due to the relative growth rates of energy prices and 
per capita income. Figure 3 shows the per capita fuel consumption for the base case. 
Oil price 
As expected, the market equilibrium price of crude oil rises continuously till it reaches 
the upper bound set by the cost of the backstop (55 $/bl). Prices for all fuels are shown in 
figure 4. 
In the absence of a backstop, the augmented Hotelling framework results in near term growth in market 
-

equilibrium quantities before the eventual decline to depletion. This contrasts to the simple Hotelling framework 
" 
in which the equilibrium declines monotonically. 
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Carbon emissions 
Figure 5 compares the carbon emissions trajectories obtained under the DICE and 
KCA base cases. The latter model yields much higher emissions levels. By 2105 the KCA 
value is more than two and a half times the value generated by DICE. Two factors explain 
this divergence. First, due to the exogenous decarbonization imposed by Nordhaus, emissions 
are a continuously declining ratio to output. Starting from an initial value of 0.519 in 1965, 
this fraction falls to 0.229 by 2105.10 In contrast, there is no autonomous energy efficiency 
imposed in KCA. Second, the synthetic fuel in KCA releases a higher amount of carbon per 
unit of energy than oil or coal (see appendix D). Thus, emissions get an added impetus when 
synfuel production begins in 2035. 11 
Carbon and energy intensity 
As mentioned above, the exogenous decarbonization implies that the carbon intensity 
of the DICE economy declines steadily. In the KCA, this is not the case. Initially, the 
carbon intensity rises slowly. When synfuel production comes on-line to replace crude oil, 
the CO2-GNP ratio rises sharply due to the relatively higher carbon intensity of this fuel. 
Thereafter, the ratio remains more or less stable. Energy intensity rises from 17 thousand 
BTU/$ in 1965 before stabilizing at about 23-24 thousand BTU/$. 
10 Tbe ratio of CO2-GNP continues to decline further, till it eventually stabilizes at about 0.19. 
II A qualification about the comparability of the results from the two models: in the Nordbaus (1994) 
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model "emissions" refer to a combination of CO2 emissions and CO2-equivalent CFC emissions. Our model 
considers only the former, as does the latest work by Nordbaus and Yang (1996). 
14 
This is an intuitively appealing result. For the next few decades, while a large 
proportion of the world's population in developing countries strives to meet its basic energy 
needs, the energy and carbon intensity of the global economy is likely to increase. Once 
these nations have acquired some minimum level of per capita income and energy 
consumption, and as energy prices rise world-wide, there will be an increased effort to reduce 
per unit energy consumption, resulting in the subsequent stabilization in energy and carbon 
intensities. This is shown in figure 6. 
Under the optimal case, while the qualitative trends remain unchanged the absolute 
levels fall somewhat when optimal controls on carbon emissions are brought into effect. Both 
carbon and energy intensity decline slightly before stabilizing. 
Temperature rise 
Both DICE and KCA measure climate change in tenns of the rise in atmospheric 
temperature above the 1865 level. Due to the higher level of emissions resulting here, we 
observe a greater temperature rise. In 2105, the results of the two models differ by more than 
1°C. Note that because of the lags in the system, the difference in temperature becomes more 
evident with time. Hence, in figure 7 we display the rise in temperature over the entire 400 
year horizon. From the 22Dd century onwards, the KCA values are approximately one and a 
half times the corresponding DICE values. 
-
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Control rate for CO2 emissions 
The optimal control rate for carbon emissions under both models is shown in figure 8. 
As expected, the control rate under our model is significantly higher than the corresponding 
value obtained by Nordhaus, reaching approximately 21.5% per decade in 2105 as compared 
to 14% per decade under DICE. This need for greater control is a result of the higher level 
of emissions, which arises from the explicit consideration of energy types, petroleum 
depletion, and a continuation of the observed constancy in carbon intensity. Note that the 
relationship between the emissions level and the optimal control rate is not linear 
homogenous. The damage and cost functions posited by Nordhaus are such that a doubling 
of the emissions level raises the optimal control rate by less than double. 
VI. A tax policy simulation 
By explicitly incorporating energy prices, the Khanna-Chapman framework facilitates 
the analysis of alternative energy tax scenarios. The impact of an energy tax on the 
emissions trajectory depends on the simultaneous interplay of the following forces. First, as 
the marginal cost of oil extraction increases due to the imposition of an exogenous tax, the 
optimal production horizon changes, and therefore, the optimal price and quantity trajectories 
change. The exact paths depend on the interaction between the intertemporally increasing 
demand for oil, and the rising marginal cost of production. Second, the introduction of 
synthetic fuels, the most carbon intensive of all the fuels considered, depends on the optimal 
production horizon for oil. Third, there are substitution possibilities between the various 
-

fuels. This means that as the price of a fuel rises there is not only the decline in emissions 
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due to the negative own price effect on demand, but also a partially offsetting increase in the 
emissions level due to the positive cross-price effect on the demand for substitute fuels. 
In this section we simulate the effectiveness of three tax scenarios in lowering the 
emissions trajectory towards the optimal level. 12 Under the first two scenarios, we impose 
taxes at differential rates that are ranked according to the relative carbon intensities of the 
fossil fuels, with the tax rates in the second case being twice as high as in the first case. The 
third scenario is designed such that the resulting emissions trajectory approximately tracks the 
optimal emissions trajectory obtained earlier. The exact tax rates used for the analysis are 
shown in table 4, overleaf. 
Note that this is a simulation and not an optimization exercise. The base case trajectory of per capita ­
income is treated as an exogenous variable for this section of the analysis. 
17 
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Table 4: Tax rates and levels under alternative scenarios 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
(Low tax) (Medium tax) (Optimal control) 
Rate: Level of tax 
(%) . 
! 1995 ! 2105 
. . 
1 ~ 
: : 
Rate: Level of tax 
(%) ··....j·99S·..·....;·j·OS.... 
Rate Level of tax 
(%) ~ ..·..·....·.. ·....·t..........·..·..·· 
~ 1995 i 2105 
Oil ($/bl)a 20 2.2 12.6 40 4.3 25.1 100 10.8 62.8 
Coal ($/ton) 30 6.8 7.6 60 13.5 15.1 200 45.1 50.4 
Nat. Gas ($/1000 cf) 10 0.3 0.4 20 0.6 0.7 100 3.1 3.5 
Synfuel ($/bl)b 40 23.6 80 47.2 300 177 
a: The tax is levied on extraction. 
b: The tax is levied once synfuel production begins in the decade of 2035. 
As evident from figure 9, the first two scenarios have limited success in reducing the 
emission levels to the optimal trajectory. For this to be achieved, we require extremely high 
tax rates, an example of which is shown in scenario three, which raise energy prices by as 
much as four times, as in the case of the synthetic fuel. 
-
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VII. Conclusions 
This paper extends the seminal work by William Nordhaus on climate change. An 
explicit treatment of energy-economy interactions which takes account of resource depletion is 
incorporated. The result is a framework that allows the analysis of the effects of specific 
energy technology developments, such as changes in the cost and nature of the backstop 
technology, and also impacts of energy taxation on carbon emissions. The model yields a 
much higher level of carbon emissions accompanied by a higher optimal control rate, relative 
to that obtained in the DICE model. The bottom line is the ensuing need for greater, quicker 
and, consequently, more expensive abatement efforts. 13 
The analysis herewith raises an important question for international climate policy. 
There is a sizeable body of literature that has persuasively argued that it would be 
inappropriate for developing countries to pay for GHG emissions reductions. 14 Indeed, the 
Climate Change Convention recognizes that developed countries must accept historical 
responsibility for the currently excessive GHG concentrations. In this context, it is unlikely 
that developing countries will accept the high emissions control rates resulting from analyses 
13 It is worth noting that some of the trends obtained in this exercise may become intensified if we were to 
consider also finite natural gas resources. Then, as Manne and Richels point out (1992, pp. 48-49), the sharply 
rising price of natural gas could erode its competitive edge over coal, specially in electricity generation, 
reinforcing the pressures for increased coal use. 
14 See, for instance, Shue (1993), Grubb (1995), Khanna and Chapman (1996), and most recently, IPCC 
-

(1996), especially chapter 3. 
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such as the present one. This, in tum, would necessitate the fonnulation of economic 
incentives so as to make the GHG reductions ethically and politically palatable. 
Furthermore, we find that high levels of energy taxation would be required to reduce 
the carbon emissions to their optimal level. In the current economic and political setting it 
seems unrealistic to expect these to be implemented. Yet, any delay in their implementation 
might warrant even higher taxation in the future. 
We have modeled a world in which there is a commercially viable substitute for 
petroleum use. However, it is possible that there is no suitable backstop technology that will 
be available to supply liquid fuel on a global basis. In this case, our framework can be 
appropriately modified. Oil production would continue till resources were exhausted, with the 
price of oil increasing without an upper bound set by the cost of the backstop. As oil 
resources approach exhaustion, the demand functions for coal and natural gas would shift in 
response to the slack in energy availability. IS 
One can only conjecture what will happen when oil becomes relatively scarce. A 
common approach is to assume that a carbon free backstop, such as hydrogen produced by 
carbon free electrolysis, or solar and nuclear power, will take its place. See, for instance, 
Manne and Richels (1992) and Peck and Teisberg (1993).16 This presumption is particularly 
important in the global warming context because, in a sense, it describes the "don't worry, be 
happy" approach: if you wait long enough, the problem will solve itself because the very 
15 In this case, transportation may shift to more costly electric vehicles, with power produced from coal, 
-

nuclear power, or solar energy. 
16 A contrasting view is expressed by Drennen et aI. (1996). 
20 
source of the problem will begin to disappear. In this analysis, we consider the problem from 
a different perspective where oil may be replaced by an even more carbon intensive 
substance, such as a coal or shale based synthetic fuel, for an appreciable length of time. 
This is accompanied by a continuation of rising energy intensity in developing countries such 
that the oft posited decline in global energy and carbon intensity from current levels is not 
realized. In this case, our analysis shows that the greenhouse problem is exacerbated. 
This line of thinking might be considered overly pessimistic in the context of other 
work such as that cited here. The important point is that it is a possibility that should not, 
nay cannot, be ignored. 
-
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APPENDIX A
 
Country names and groupings
 
High income countries 
1. Australia 2. Austria 3. Belgium 4. Canada 
5. Cyprus 6. Denmark 7. Finland 8. France 
9. Gennany 10. Hongkong 11. Iceland 12. Ireland 
13. Israel 14. Italy 15. Japan 16. Luxembourg 
17. Netherlands 18. New Zealand 19. Norway 20. Spain 
21. Sweden 22. Switzerland 23. U.K. 24. U.S.A 
Other countries 
1. Algeria 2. Argentina 3. Bangladesh 4. Benin 
5. Bolivia 6. Brazil 7. Burkina Faso 8. Burundi 
9. Cameroon 10. Cape Verdi 11. Central African Rep. 12. Chad 
13. Chile 14. China 15. Colombia 16. Comoros 
17. Congo 18. Costa Rica 19. Dominican Rep. 20. Ecuador 
21. Egypt 22. EI Salvador 23. Gabon 24. Gambia 
25. Ghana 26. Greece 27. Guatemala 28. Guinea 
29. Guinea-Bissau 30. Guyana 31. Honduras 32. Hungary 
33. India 34. Indonesia 35. Iran 36. Ivory Coast 
37. Jamaica 38. Jordan 39. Kenya 40. Korea 
-41. Madagascar 42. Malawi 43. Malaysia 44. Mali 
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Other countries (continued) 
45. Mauritania 46. Mauritius 47. Mexico 48. Morocco 
49. Mozambique 50. Nicaragua 51. Nigeria 52. Pakistan 
53. Panama 54. Papua New Guinea 55. Paraguay 56. Peru 
57. Philippines 58. Poland 59. Portugal 60. Rwanda 
61. South Africa 62. Senegal 63. Seychelles 64. Sierra Leone 
65. Sri Lanka 66. Sudan 67. Syria 68. Thailand 
69. Togo 70. Trinidad & Tobago 71. Tunisia 72. Turkey 
73. Uganda 74. Uruguay 75. Venezuela 76. Zambia 
77. Zimbabwe 
-
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APPENDIX B
 
A brief overview of the Nordhaus DICE model and the Khanna-Chapman modification!7 
The DICE model comprises a representative agent, optimal growth model with an 
intertemporal objective function which maximizes the present value of utility. A unique 
feature of the model is the linkage of these economic relationships with several significant 
geophysical relationships that are a stylized presentation of a global circulation model. The 
decision variables are the rate of investment and the fraction by which GHG emissions are 
reduced. These variables are analogous to investment in tangible capital in the Ramsey 
(1928) model: present consumption must be curbed to decrease GHG emissions which would 
ameliorate climate change which, in turn, would allow higher levels of future consumption. 
The world economy produces a composite economic product using a constant returns 
to scale, Cobb-Douglas production function in capital, labour and technology. Production is 
associated with the emissions of GHGs. The DICE model assumes that only CO2 and 
chloroflorocarbons (CFCs) are controlled. Other GHGs are determined exogenously. The 
uncontrolled level of emissions in any period is proportional to the level of output. The 
transfonnation parameter is assumed to decline over time, according to the growth in total 
factor productivity. 
The accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere depends not only on the emission 
levels, but also on the rate at which carbon diffuses into the deep ocean. The ambient 
-

This section is based on Nordhaus (1994, pp. 7·21). The GAMS program for the model is presented in 
pp. 191-197. The regional RICE model is defined in the appendix to Nordhaus and Yang (1996). 
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atmospheric carbon level in any period, therefore, depends on two parameters - the 
atmospheric retention ratio and the rate of transfer to the deep ocean. These parameters are 
assumed to be time invariant. 
With the accumulation of GHGs comes the rise in global mean surface temperature. 
The relation between GHG emissions and increased radiative forcing has been derived from 
empirical studies and climate models. The link between increased radiative forcing and 
climate change is established by another geophysical relation that incorporates the lags in the 
warming of the various layers in the climate system, such that a doubling of ambient CO2 
emissions increases radiative forcing by 4.1 watts per meter square. 
The economic impact of climate change, represented by the fraction of output lost, is a 
quadratic function in the increase in atmospheric temperature. The cost of reducing emissions 
is also assumed to increase with the rise in temperature through an empirically detennined 
relationship. Damage and cost relations come together through an additional shift parameter 
in the production function. 
Finally, the model is designed to maximize the discounted value of the utility of per 
capita consumption, using a pure rate of time preference of 3% per year. The model has a 
horizon of 400 years starting from 1965, and operates in time steps of one decade. 
In Nordhaus's formulation of the DICE model, emissions in any period are a fraction 
of gross world output. Over time, as technology evolves this fraction declines and eventually 
levels off. Our fonnulation of the model has the methodological advantage of incorporating 
other factors that directly influence the emissions level. The model takes cognizance of 
various fossil fuels, each of which result in different levels of CO2 emissions per unit of ­
30 
energy. The quantity of each fuel consumed in any period depends on both economic forces 
(relative prices and per capita income) and technology (elasticities of substitution). 
Furthermore, there are fmite resources for some fuels. Thus, the level of CO2 released 
depends not only on the level of output produced, but also on the interplay of other factors. 
-
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APPENDIX C 
Optimal trajectory for crude oil production in a competitive markees 
Producers maximize the net present value (NPV) of competitive profits by choosing 
the optimal duration of oil production, T, and the quantity produced at each time, qr' given the 
demand and cost schedules. Following Chapman (1993) this can be represented as: 
Maximize NPV w.r.t. [qr' 11, where 
"T [Pt(q" Lt , Yt) - C(t)]qt(') (Cl)NPV = LJo (l + r)t 
(C2)
 
(C3) 
Pt' qt' Pt - qt ~ 0 (C4) 
where P,: price of oil at time t 
T: optimal duration of production 
~: population at time t 
r: pure rate of time preference 
~l: slope of demand curve 
y: income elasticity 
qr: production of crude oil at time t 
C,: cost of extraction at time t 
Yt : per capita income at time t 
s: remaining oil resources 
~2: calibration constant 
ep: growth rate of extraction cost 
18 Chapman (1993) also details results for a monopolistic oil market and a sequence of a near-term 
competitive market followed by a monopolistic market 
32 
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The Hamiltonian for this problem is: 
[Pt(qt' Lt, Yt) - C(t)] ap == 0 (C5)H = - "'tqt'(1 + rt Oq 
where A. is the co-state variable, representing the change in the discounted NPV due to a small 
change in the quantity of remaining crude resources. The optimal trajectory can be found by 
solving the first order conditions and constraints simultaneously. The solution is: 
(1 + rt (5 _ (C6)qt = P3, + M(r) PJ 
YP LtYt - C(t)2 (C7)P3, = PI 
(C8)
 
M(r) = ~ (1 + rt (C9) 
The optimal duration of production, T, is the minimum of TJ and T2 
Tz = T: Pt = k 
: 
(CIO) 
(Cll) 
where k is the exogenously specified cost of the backstop. -
33 
In the Khanna-Chapman model, equations (C2) and (C7) through (CII) determine the 
optimal production and price trajectory for crude oil simultaneously with per capita income 
and the other variables in the model. 
-
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APPENDIX D: Parameter values 
Parameter Value Data sources 
Energy demand elasticities 
own-price 
cross-price 
income 
- 0.5 
0.25 
1 
Drennen (1993) 
Drennen (1993) 
Energy prices: 1965, 1995 
coal (price to utilities, $1b1) 
natural gas ($/1000 cf) 
Growth rate (% per year) 
21.82, 22.56 
2.27, 3.14 
0.1 
EIA (1994 and 1996. respectively) 
AGA (1981), and EIA (1996). 
Per capita energy consumption: 1965 
coal (mbtu) 
natural gas (mbtu) 
15.58 
7.14 
Based on energy data from Brown et 
aI. (1995), and population data from 
Nordhaus (1994). 
Cost of backstop 
Initial value ($lbl) 
Growth rate (% per year) 
55 
0.1 
Cost of extraction 
1965 value ($lbl) 
Growth rale (% per year) 
6.71 
1.61 
Based on Chapman (1993) 
see text 
Carbon coefficients (BTC/quad) 
coal 
oil 
natural gas 
synfuel 
0.0254 
0.0210 
0.0144 
0.0421 
Based on Manne and Richels (1992) 
Note: 1. Data are in 1989 $ where applicable. The base year was changed using the implicit 
GDP deflators obtained from EIA (1994) and BEA (1996) 
2. Natural gas price is the volume weighted average for all consuming sectors. 
-
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Fig. 1: Observed Energy Intensity, 1971-1990 
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Fig. 3: Per Capita Energy Consumption 
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Fig. 5: Carbon Emissions 
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Fig. 6: Projected Energy and Carbon Intensity 
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